IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division

ePLUS INC.,)
Plaintiff,) Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-620 (REP)
v.)
LAWSON SOFTWARE, INC.,)
)
Defendant.))

DECLARATION OF SRIKANTH K. REDDY IN SUPPORT OF ePLUS INC.'S OPPOSITION TO LAWSON'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE EXPERT OPINIONS OF DR. KEITH UGONE

- I, Srikanth K. Reddy, declare as follows:
- 1. I am an associate at Goodwin Procter LLP, counsel for Plaintiff ePlus Inc.

 ("ePlus") in this proceeding. I submit this declaration in support of ePlus Inc.'s Opposition to

 Lawson's Motion to Strike the Expert Opinions of Dr. Keith Ugone.
- 2. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and, if called as a witness, could and would testify competently hereto.
- 3. Attached as Exhibit 1 is a true and accurate copy of *Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.*, Case No 05-cv-467, slip op. at 22-27 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2008)
- 4. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a true and accurate copy of excerpts from the transcript of the phone conference held in this matter on August 10, 2010 (Dkt. No.409).

- 5. Attached as Exhibit 3 is a true and accurate copy of excerpts from the transcript of the Evidentiary Hearing held in this matter on March 25, 2010 (Dkt. No.637).
- 6. Attached as Exhibit 4 is a true and accurate copy of excerpts from the confidential transcript of the deposition of Kurt Reasoner, dated January 9, 2012 (filed under seal).
- 7. Attached as Exhibit 5 is a true and accurate copy of excerpts from the confidential transcript of the deposition of Dale Christopherson, dated October 19, 2009 (filed under seal).
- 8. Attached as Exhibit 6 is a true and accurate copy of a confidential document produced by Defendant in this matter under Bates numbers RQC2115799 through RQC2115832 (filed under seal).
- 9. Attached as Exhibit 7 is a true and accurate copy of Defendant Lawson Software, Inc.'s Rule 26 Supplemental Disclosure Concerning Injunctive Relief and Evidentiary Hearing, dated February 14, 2012.
- 10. Attached as Exhibit 8 is a true and accurate copy of the confidential Exhibit 10 to the transcript of the deposition of Keith R. Ugone, Ph.D., dated February 20, 2012 (filed under seal).

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Boston, Massachusetts, this 22th day of February, 2012.

Stikanth K. Reddy

EXHIBIT 1

to comply with the '686 injunction,² the '010 injunction,³ and the reporting requirements. (Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Broadcom Corporation's Application for Order to Show Cause re Contempt of Permanent Injunction, §§ I-III, VIII.) The Court also ordered limited discovery.

Having considered the parties' further briefing and oral argument, the Court now enters its ruling, granting the Motion in part, denying the Motion in part, and ordering further proceedings.

I. <u>Legal Standards.</u>

The parties are in agreement concerning the basic principles which govern this Motion, and they need be recited only briefly.

The Ninth Circuit has summarized this Circuit's law of contempt in <u>In re</u>

<u>Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litigation</u>, 10 F.3d 693, 95 (9th Cir. 1993):

Civil contempt in this context consists of a party's <u>disobedience to a specific</u> and <u>definite court order by failure to take all reasonable steps within the party's power to comply</u>. The contempt need not be willful, and there is no good faith exception to the requirement of obedience to a court order. But a person should not be held in contempt if his action appears to be based on a good faith and reasonable interpretation of the [court's order]. <u>Substantial compliance</u> with the court order is a defense to civil contempt, and <u>is not</u>

²U.S. Patent No. 6,847,686.

³U.S. Patent No. 6,389,010.

<u>vitiated by a few technical violations</u> where every reasonable effort has been made to comply.

(Internal citations and quotation marks deleted; emphasis supplied.) Having initiated this proceeding, Broadcom bears the burden of proving contempt by clear and convincing evidence. <u>Id.</u>; <u>KSM Fastening Systems</u>, <u>Inc.</u> v. H.A. Jones Co., <u>Inc.</u>, 776 F.2d 1522, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

Substantive principles of patent law also come into play, particularly the doctrine of implied license. A patentee who has been fully compensated for the infringer's wrongful conduct has, as a matter of law, granted a license for continued use:

A patentee, in demanding and receiving full compensation for the wrongful use of his invention in devices made and sold by a manufacturer adopts the sales as though made by himself, and therefore necessarily licenses the use of the devices, and frees them from the monopoly of the patent. This license continues during the life of the machine; it does not end when repairs become necessary.

<u>Union Tool Co. v. Wilson</u>, 259 U.S. 107, 113 (1922) (emphasis supplied); <u>King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp.</u>, 814 F.2d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

- II. The '686 Patent.
 - A. Scope of the '686 Injunction.

The jury found that Qualcomm infringed the '686 patent, and awarded

\$11,187,194 in damages. Certain of the infringing products could be used on WCDMA networks, certain could be used on CDMA 1x/EV-DO ("CDMA") networks. In crafting the '686 injunction, the Court carefully considered the differences between the market for chips in both environments, including competition and the availability of competitive alternatives. (Memorandum of Decision re Injunctive Relief, p. 19, Docket No. 996 ["Injunction Memo"].) Those considerations caused the Court to adopt a sunset provision for CDMA uses but not WCDMA uses. The Court stayed the Injunction for CDMA uses:

PROVIDED, . . . that with respect to '686 Infringing Products (i) capable of operating on a CDMA2000 1xEV-DO network, (ii) which were on sale in or imported into the United States on or before May 29, 2007,⁴ and (iii) with regard only to existing or prior customers of '686 Infringing Products as of May 29, 2007 (which status shall be determined separately with respect to each '686 Infringing Product), the injunction against activities listed in

paragraphs (a) and (b) above shall be stayed until January 31, 2009, so long as:

(a) Qualcomm pays to Broadcom an ongoing royalty, consisting of 6% of all revenues received by Qualcomm for sales occurring after May 29, 2007 of '686 Infringing Products that are sold in or imported into the United States;

⁴Footnote 1 in original: With respect to each '686, '317, and '010 Infringing Product, such Infringing Product shall deemed to have been sold or imported into the United States if the sale resulted in an intermediate delivery outside the United States for purposes of manufacture, modification, incorporation into another device, or for like purposes, so long as the ultimate purpose of the transaction was for sale or importation of the Infringing Product into the United States.

(Permanent Injunction, § I, Proviso.) Broadcom asserts that Qualcomm has violated the inunction in multiple contexts with regard to its sale and other practices surrounding chips for WCDMA, for convenience "WCDMA sales." Thus the first question is the effect of the Injunction on WCDMA sales.

Broadcom takes the position that the Injunction provides no sunset protection for WCDMA sales subsequent to December 31, 2007, the date of the Injunction. Qualcomm does not directly dispute this, but takes a different and expansive view on the theory that subparagraph (a) requires it to pay a sunset royalty on all "686 Infringing Products," including WCDMA Infringing Products, in order to avail itself of the CDMA sunset provision. But Qualcomm does not stop there: It argues that having paid a royalty on such WCDMA Infringing Products, it is entitled to the benefit of an implied license. Qualcomm's reading is mistaken for several reasons.

Had the Court intended to grant a sunset provision for WCDMA Infringing Products, it would have done so directly and expressly. Clearly, the sunset provision, as quoted above, is for CDMA chips only. Moreover, Qualcomm's reading is directly contrary to the Court's express rationale for not adopting a sunset provision for WCDMA products: The Court intended to free Broadcom from head-to-head competition with Qualcomm using Broadcom's patented technology. Thus the Court enjoined sales of those '686 chips in the market where Qualcomm and Broadcom compete. (Injunction Memo, pp. 17-19.)

In the full context of '686 injunction, it is plain that the royalty provision refers to "Infringing '686 Products" which meet the further requirement that they serve CDMA networks. Qualcomm enjoys neither the right nor does it have the obligation to pay a royalty on WCDMA products sold after May 29, 2007.

Qualcomm is ordered to revise and resubmit the April 14, 2008 royalty report accordingly.

At oral argument, Qualcomm asserted that during the meet-and-confer process leading to a motion to clarify the original Injunction, Broadcom had conceded that upon payment of royalties on WCDMA sales during the period between the jury's verdict, May 29, 2007, and the entry of the Injunction, December 31, 2007 (the "Window"), Qualcomm would have the right to support such WCDMA sales. Broadcom denied such agreement, and none is memorialized in the pleadings or otherwise. However, both parties asserted that their views were reflected in the subsequent briefing on the motion for clarification (Docket No. 1049). The Court invited limited additional letter briefs on the issue.

The original Injunction contained no express discussion of Qualcomm's right to support infringing chips. Among the clarifications adopted in the Amended and Restated Permanent Injunction, entered February 5, 2008 (Docket No. 1072), was a new Section VI entitled "Permissible Technical Support":

Nothing is this Amended and Restated Permanent Injunction shall prohibit the Qualcomm Parties from providing service or technical support, including without limitation software debugging, for a '686, '317, or '010 Infringing Product for which Broadcom has been compensated under the jury's Verdict or for which Qualcomm is obligated to and makes a timely royalty payments in accordance with the sunset provisions in Section I, II, and III, supra. ⁵

⁵The provision in the currently operative Second Amended and Restated Permanent Injunction is identical except for insertion of the word "Second" in the first line. (Permanent Injunction, § VI, Docket No. 1183.)

(Amended and Restated Permanent Injunction, Section VI; emphasis supplied.)

Qualcomm argues that because it was obligated to pay royalties on WCDMA chip sales during the Window, the new provision permits it to support those chips. But that is the flaw. As discussed above, no such royalty obligation exists. Moreover, during the briefing on the motion for clarification, Qualcomm realized that the above formulation would potentially leave some infringing chip sales without support: "Qualcomm opposes Broadcom's proposed modification because the wording suggests there may be a subset of Qualcomm production that are not entitled to technical support." (Qualcomm Corporation's Opposition to Broadcom's Newly Proposed Modification to the Court's Injunction, p. 12.) The language which Broadcom had proposed is substantially similar to the language which the Court adopted.⁶ At oral argument, the most favorable gloss Qualcomm could put on the provision was that it "doesn't speak to WCDMA one way or another." (Transcript, July 21, 2008, p. 41 ["Tr."].)

Admittedly, the Court's ruling leaves a lacuna in the relief granted under the '686 Patent. The jury awarded damages through the date of verdict, May 29, 2007; the Court enjoined sales of WCDMA Infringing Products on December 31, 2007. Neither form of relief addresses sales for WCDMA Infringing Products during the Window. However, such sales were clearly infringing, and by virtue of the verdict, Qualcomm was on notice. The Court leaves to Broadcom whether and how this lacuna should be filled. It declines to put that choice in Qualcomm's hands to

⁶Broadcom proposed:

Nothing in this Permanent Injunction shall prohibit the Qualcomm Parties from providing service or technical support for any Infringing Product for which Qualcomm has paid damages or for which Qualcomm has paid or intends to pay a royalty as permitted by this Injunction.

(Broadcom Corporation's Proposed Clarifications to the Court's Permanent Injunction, p. 6.)

make a unilateral decision.

Obviously, Qualcomm could not have been on notice of the Court's Injunction between the date of verdict and the entry of the Injunction. Thus, for contempt purposes, the Court evaluates its conduct with regard to WCDMA Infringing Products subsequent to December 31, 2007.

B. Qualcomm's Activities in Contempt of the '686 Injunction.

The Court enjoined Qualcomm from:

making, using, importing, selling, and/or offering to sell in the United States the MSM6275, MSM6280, MSM6550, MSM6800, MSM7200, MSM7500, and MSM7600 baseband chips, or any device not more than colorably different therefrom (collectively, the "'686 Infringing Products"), or any device that includes any '686 Infringing Product (including, without limitation, cellular telephone handsets, Form Factor Accurate ("FFA") devices, and Subscriber Unit Reference ("SURF") devices);

(Permanent Injunction, § I(a).) In their showings on this Motion, the parties parse each of these activities.

Qualcomm offers two basic defenses for its conduct with regard to WCDMA sales after December 31, 2007. First, a portion of its activities were carried out under its agreement with Verizon. The parties have agreed that such activities carried out under the license which Broadcom granted to Verizon are not infringing. (Joint Stipulation Regarding Licensing Agreement and Order Thereon, Feb. 5, 2008, Docket No. 1002.) Second, by virtue of its payment of (1) damages

through May 29, 2007 under the verdict, and (2) its payment of royalties from the date of the verdict through March 31, 2008, and a purported continuing obligation to pay royalties, Qualcomm contends that it has an implied license. For the reasons stated above, the Court rejects the second component of the implied license defense. Qualcomm is entitled to an implied license only with respect to WCDMA sales for which damages were assessed under the verdict.

The Court now considers the list of activities specifically challenged by Broadcom.

1. Sales Prior to December 31, 2007.

Qualcomm concedes that sales of WCDMA Infringing Products were made in the Window which were subsequently imported into the United States. The Court finds no contempt, because, by definition Qualcomm was not on notice of the Permanent Injunction.

Additionally, the Court finds that sales of WCDMA Infringing Products for Verizon products are permitted under the Permanent Injunction, and do not constitute a contempt.⁷

2. Customer Support.

The analysis breaks into three parts.

⁷The same is true with regard to support and all other activities covered by the Verizon Agreement which would otherwise amount to actionable infringement. For that reason, the Court will not discuss those activities in the balance of the Order unless otherwise relevant.

First, with respect to sales of WCDMA Infringing Products for which damages were awarded under the verdict, Qualcomm is entitled to provide those specific customers on-going support with respect to those specific purchases. King Instrument Corp., 814 F.2d at 1564. The Court refers to these and other activities and uses permitted by virtue of the verdict as "Licensed Activities."

Second, the Court finds no contempt for support provided in the Window for WCDMA Infringing Products sold during the Window.

Third, the Court finds that Qualcomm violated the '686 injunction when it provided support after December 31, 2007 for WCDMA Infringing Products, except for Licensed Activities. On the present record, the Court cannot define the full extent of such violations.

Because Qualcomm's interpretation of the '686 sunset provision is not reasonable, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that its support activities after December 31, 2007, other than Licensed Activities, constitute contempt.

3. Employee Use of Paid-For WCDMA Phones.

The same three-part analysis applied to customer support, above, is equally applicable to Qualcomm employee use of WCDMA phones.

On the present record, the Court cannot define the full extent of such violations subsequent to December 31, 2007.

Because Qualcomm's interpretation of the '686 sunset provision is not

reasonable, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that its employee use of WCDMA phones after December 1, 2007, other than Licensed Activities, constitutes contempt.

4. Selling WCDMA SURFs.

Qualcomm concedes that after the Injunction it sold a SURF with a socket, or socket SURF, that could accommodate one of the WCDMA Infringing Products, but argues that the unit was shipped with an empty socket. (Qualcomm Memo, p. 16.) The SURF is not the patented product, nor is it component of a patented product—i.e., the broadband chip. The Court thus finds that Qualcomm is correct when it argues that the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) are inapplicable.⁸

This conduct does not constitute contempt.

Next, the Court considers whether Qualcomm has complied with the remaining generic portions of the Injunction.⁹

1. Making.

The Court is satisfied that all manufacturing activities for broadband chips take place outside the United States, and thus the activity is not covered by the Permanent Injunction. (Permanent Injunction, § IV.)

⁸This assumes that Broadcom asserted a Section 271(f) claim for the '686 Patent. (See Tr. 75.)

 $^{^{9}}$ "[M]aking, using, importing, selling, and/or offering to sell in the United States." (Permanent Injunction, \P 1(a).)

Qualcomm asserts that all manufacture of SURFs or FFAs containing WCDMA Infringing Products has been carried out directly or indirectly as part of the Verizon arrangement. It does acknowledge other manufacturing which it asserts is outside the Injunction: including a "socketed SURF" (MSM7200A); versions of the MSM 6290 with the texture engine ("TE") function disabled or the fuse blown; and MSM 7225 chips with the TE function disabled.

The Court finds no violation of the Injunction.

2. Chip Use.

Qualcomm asserts that it has used chips for testing only to support Verizon, to support its development of TE-disabled design-around chips, ¹⁰ or for uses of chips with the video fuse blown.

Use of chips in third-party devices is subject to the three-part analysis discussed above. On the present record, the Court cannot define the full extent of such violations subsequent to December 31, 2007.

Qualcomm asserts that it prohibits the use of SURFs/FFAs unless permitted under the Verizon arrangment in a use exclusively for Verizon's benefit.

3. <u>Importing</u>.

Qualcomm asserts that it has imported WCDMA Infringing Products only for four purposes: (1) to modify on importation to render non-infringing by

¹⁰See discussion of design-arounds in Section VI.A, infra.

disabling the TE function; (2) to modify on importation to render non-infringing by blowing the video fuse; (3) for destruction upon importation; and (4) for Verizon activities. All of these uses are permitted under the Permanent Injunction. (Permanent Injunction, §§ V, VII.)¹¹

Qualcomm has outlined its screening procedures for shipments coming via courier and freight forwarder to ensure importation only for a permitted purpose. The Court finds that those procedures are reasonable and constitute substantial compliance.

Broadcom has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that Qualcomm's importation activities constitute a contempt.

4. Selling.

Broadband Chips.

Qualcomm admits that it has sold WCDMA Infringing Products in 2008 in violation of the Permanent Injunction. (Qualcomm Memo, pp. 27-28.) The parties describe these sales differently, but they amount to slightly more than 1000 chips, of three different models, made to four customers.¹² Qualcomm asserts that the chips were samples, and that it received revenue for only two sales (\$18,508.65.)

¹¹"Nothing is this Second Amended and Restated Permanent Injunction shall prohibit the Qualcomm Parties from importing into the United States any '686 Infringing Product, '317 Infringing Product, or '010 Infringing Product solely for the purpose of engaging in design, development, or testing so as to eliminate infringement and/or effecting modification to eliminate infringement." (Permanent Injunction, § V.)

¹²Qualcomm describes fourteen shipments (Qualcomm Memo, p. 28); Broadcom describes seven shipments (Broadcom Opp., p. 7).

Qualcomm explains that certain customers with research, but not manufacturing, facilities in the United States were taken off "hold" which allowed WCDMA Infringing Products to be sold and shipped to them. Qualcomm contends that it has modified its shipment compliance procedures in light of this error. In its reply, Qualcomm also points to the remedial steps it has taken to procure the return of these chips or assurances that chips from foreign sales will not be imported for use in the United States. (Qualcomm Reply, p. 2.)

The Court finds substantial compliance in light of the remedial steps taken to resolve the initial internal systems defect and the efforts to secure return of the chips. In the overall analysis, the number of chips is inconsequential, particularly when spread over four customers and several types of chips.

SURFs/FFAs.

Broadcom asserts that since December 31, 2007, Qualcomm has sold over 2,000 SURFs/FFAs in models MSM 6290, MSM7225, MSM7600, and MSM7601. The combination of Darin Tripi's deposition testimony and declaration provide a sufficient explanation with regard to the first two products. He testified that none of the MSM6290 and MSM7225 products could be used for video encoding. (Ex. 18, pp. 47-48, 51, 142-147 [Tripi].) Similarly, the MSM7601 product cannot be used for video encoding. (Roy Decl., ¶ 13.) The remaining device, the MSM7600, was sold to Research in Motion whose only customer is Verizon. (Ex. 7, p. 28 [Roy].)

Broadcom has not offered clear and convincing evidence of contempt.

5. Offering to Sell.

Qualcomm describes a compliance program for issuing quotations for WCDMA Infringing Products only through foreign regional offices for delivery to customers outside the United States. However, Qualcomm concedes that some quotations issued after December 31, 2007 were sent to United States addresses. (Qualcomm Memo, p. 30.)

Through discovery, Broadcom has documented that such offers were made to LG International America, Samsung Electronic America, Kyocera Wireless, Motorola, Inc., Novatel Wireless, Palm, Inc., and AnyData Corporation. (Broadcom Opp., pp. 9-11.) The number of offers and quoted volumes convinces the Court that Qualcomm failed to take all reasonable steps to comply with the Injunction against "offering to sell in the United States." (Permanent Injunction, § I(a).)

The Court finds that these offers are likely contempts in violation of the Permanent Injunction. The Court finds that it is sufficient that the offers were made in the United States. Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. 256 F.Supp. 2d 228, 233-34 (D. Del. 2003); SEB, S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 412 F.Supp. 2d 336 341-43 (S.D. N.Y. 2006). This result is implicitly consistent with the Federal Circuit's treatment of the issue in Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Newman, J., concurring).

Qualcomm official Leonard Territo ("Territo") was unclear at deposition whether actual sales had resulted from any of these offers. However, in his declaration, Territo asserts that Qualcomm's shipment histories indicate that no

shipments were made to the United States in response to any of the quotes. 13 (Territo Decl., \P 7.)

Qualcomm apparently offered to produce the purchase orders related to the quotations, but then declined to do so. Before coming to a final conclusion on the legal and factual issues raised by the offers, the Court believes further discovery should be made to Broadcom. The Court orders production of all such purchase orders.

6. Technical Support.

Qualcomm indicates that it has responded to more than 54,000 requests for technical support in the past year with regard to Infringing WCDMA Products, but that such response have been limited to Verizon and "downstream customers" who purchased the relevant chips prior to December 31, 2007.

For reasons discussed above, support for WCDMA Infringing Products sold during the Window and rendered after December 31, 2007 violates the Permanent Injunction, and constitutes a contempt. On the present record, the Court cannot assess the extent of the violations.

III. The '010 Patent.

A. Sunset Royalty Payments.

¹³Given the high standard of proof on the present motion, the Court accepts Territo's declaration, and declines too parse to finely whether Territo as Qualcomm's rule 30(b)(6) designee took a different position or whether his declaration simply filled in incomplete knowledge. See Diamond Triumph Auto Glass, Inc. v. Safelite Glass Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 695, 723 & n. 17 (M.D. Pa. 2006).

In the Permanent Injunction, the Court provides a sunset royalty for use of Q-Chat technology under the '010 Patent:

PROVIDED . . . that with respect to '010 Infringing Products (i) which were on sale in or imported into the United States on or before May 29, 2007, ¹⁴ and (ii) with regard only to existing or prior customers of '010 Infringing Products as of May 29, 2007 (which status shall be determined separately with respect to each '010 Infringing Product), the injunction against activities listed in paragraphs (a) and (b) above shall be stayed until January 31, 2009, so long as:

(a) Qualcomm pays to Broadcom an ongoing royalty, consisting of 15% of all revenues received by Qualcomm for sales occurring after May 29, 2007 of '010 Infringing Products, including revenues received from pre- and post-commercialization development fees and licenses, that are sold in, or imported into, or licensed in the United States.

(Permanent Injunction, § III, Proviso.) This provision evolved in several respects from the original Injunction issued on December 31, 2007. First, the Court effectively limited the sunset provision to Q-Chat Version 3.0 by restricting it to "versions of software which had been delivered, accepted, and paid for as of May 29, 2007." (Id., p. 8, n. 7, quoted below in footnote 14.) Second, the Court clarified the types of revenues subject to the royalty payment to include "pre- and post-commercialization development fees and licenses." (Id., §III, Proviso (a).)

¹⁴ Footnote 7 in original: With respect to software encompassed within the '010 Infringing Products, this sunset provision shall be limited to versions of software which had been delivered, accepted, and paid for as of May 29, 2007.

Qualcomm claims that it is not required to avail itself of the '010 sunset provision, contends that it has not done so, and has made no royalty payments.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Qualcomm is in contempt.

As Broadcom documents, Qualcomm has received more than \$93 million in Q-Chat-related payments from Sprint since the date of the verdict. (Broadcom Opp., pp. 33-36; Ex. 24.)

Qualcomm's principal defense is that Broadcom received full compensation under the verdict, and thus is not entitled to further compensation in view of the implied license conferred. King Instrument Corp., 814 F.2d at 1564. The Court disagrees. Broadcom could not have presented evidence of future revenues which did not then exist prior to commercialization. Some of the post-commercialization services were not contracted for until after the entry of the Injunction on December 31, 2007. (Ex. 75.) Tellingly, even as of the date of recent discovery which the Court allowed on this Motion, Qualcomm officials could still not predict the future revenue flow under the Sprint agreement. (Ex. 52, p. 52 [Vrechek].) The present situation is simply not akin to supplying spare parts for repair. King Instrument Corp., 814 F.2d at 1564.

Qualcomm argues that there has been no sale since the verdict, so that the royalty provision does not come into play. Given the Court's revisions to the '010 royalty provision to include "revenues received from pre- and post-commercialization development fees and licenses," this linguistic gamut fails. Moreover, the language in footnote 7 to the sunset provision would, under Qualcomm's logic, render the sunset provision a complete nullity from the outset.

B. Versions 3.1 and 3.2.

The record indicates that Qualcomm has received \$17 million in fees from Sprint in connection with follow-on versions. The Permanent Injunction explicitly allows Qualcomm to engage in design-around activities. (Permanent Injunction, § V.) The record does not establish by clear and convincing evidence that Qualcomm has done anything more than permitted activities. (See Ex. 52, pp. 22, 24 [Vrechek].)

While it may be frustrating to Broadcom to be denied the particulars of Qualcomm's Q-Chat design-around efforts (Broadcom Opp., p. 34), the Court agrees with Qualcomm that it has no burden to prove that it is not infringing with its Version 3.1 and 3.2 efforts.

IV. <u>Inventory Adjustments</u>. 15

In its April 14, 2008 initial royalty report, Qualcomm made a one-time \$4.6 million so-called inventory adjustment to eliminate double-counting. Such double-counting could result if a product included in Broadcom's damage calculation were counted a second time when subsequently imported into the United States. Broadcom challenges the calculation in several particulars.

Qualcomm queried two of its largest customers who responded that their inventory lag between sale and importation was 6 weeks and 5.2 weeks.

¹⁵While the Court agrees in theory with the notion of an inventory adjustment to avoid double counting, the preferable course would have been to air the issue with the Court and Broadcom before Qualcomm made a unilateral determination that it was entitled to a reduction in the initial royalty payment.

Broadcom points out that Samsung, another major customer, reported an inventory lag of 3.2 weeks, although Qualcomm excluded Samsung in its analysis because its response was deemed incomplete. Broadcom also points to testimony of Qualcomm personnel that its inventory analysis would not meet audit standards. On this record, the Court cannot say that the use of 5.2 weeks was unreasonable.

Broadcom also objects that the adjustment was not tied to chips for which the jury actually awarded damages. Qualcomm's assertion that this would require "some sort of a magic tracer" is colorful, but off the mark. (Qualcomm Br., p. 44.) Broadcom points to three chips used in the inventory adjustment—the MSM6500, MSM 6550A, and MSM6800A—which did not figure in Broadcom's damages, but which nevertheless form a major part of the adjustment calculation. (See Ex. 78.) Broadcom also notes that sales to customers not included in the damage award were nevertheless included in the adjustment. (Broadcom Opp., p. 50.) The Court believes that substantial improvement in the calculation can be achieved even if one accepts that the adjustment is at best an estimate.

Within thirty days, Qualcomm is ordered to submit a revised inventory adjustment calculation which is based only on chips included in the damage award which were sold to customers included in the damage award. Any challenge to the revised calculation may be brought by motion within thirty days of service of the revised calculation.

V. <u>Identification of Sunset Customers.</u>

In crafting the sunset provisions in the Permanent Injunction, the Court gave weight to the reliance Qualcomm's existing customers had placed on the availability of Qualcomm's products, particularly in the CDMA environment. For

that reason, the Court crafted the sunset provisions to serve only the needs of that set of customers. For example, for the '686 Patent, the Court limited sunset sales "to existing or prior customers of '686 Infringing Products as of May 29, 2007 (which status shall be determined separately with respect to each '686 Infringing Product)." (Permanent Injunction, § I, Proviso; see id., p.3 n. 1.) Broadcom contends that Qualcomm has failed to take sufficient measures to ensure sunset sales only to permitted customers.

The Court cannot say that the steps taken by Qualcomm were not reasonable or do not constitute substantial compliance with the customer set limitation. The Court finds that it is reasonable to aggregate affiliates, reasonable to make a determination on the basis of chip model rather than individual chips, and reasonable to treat the ship/billing date as the date of sale for purposes of the Permanent Injunction.

The Court cannot fault Qualcomm for taking iterative steps when it concluded that its initial customer identifications contained a loophole. Any shortcomings in the language of the "intent letters" solicited from customers must be weighed against the fact that all customers were supplied a copy of the Permanent Injunction. (Permanent Injunction, § VIII.)

Broadcom has failed to offer clear and convincing evidence of contempt with respect to sunset customer limitations.¹⁶

¹⁶Broadcom also asserts that certain revenues were not reported in the April 14, 2008 royalty reports. (Broadcom Opp., pp. 45-47.) The Court finds Qualcomm's explanation satisfactory. (Qualcomm Reply, pp. 25-27.) In any event, this does not rise to clear and convincing evidence of evasion of Qualcomm's royalty obligations.

VI. Remedies.

In a contempt proceeding, the Court has the power to fashion appropriate sanctions. <u>Lasar v. Ford Motor Co.</u>, 399 F.3d 1101, 1118 (9th Cir. 2005).

A. Enjoining the xxx1 Design-Around Chips.

Broadcom contends that by virtue of its activities in contempt, Qualcomm got an unfair "head-start" in the development of its xxx1 design-around chip with disabled TE function. For this, Broadcom urges the Court to enjoin sale of the chips for a period of six months. The Court declines to do so.

In the context of developing design-arounds for its products, Qualcomm is entitled to undertake activities which would otherwise violate the Permanent Injunction and amount to actionable continuing infringement:

Nothing is this Second Amended and Restated Permanent Injunction shall prohibit the Qualcomm Parties from engaging in the design, development, or testing of any product or service which does not infringe the '686 Patent, the '317 Patent, and/or the '010 Patent. Nothing is this Second Amended and Restated Permanent Injunction shall prohibit the Qualcomm Parties from engaging in modification of any '686 Infringing Product, '317 Infringing Product, or '010 Infringing Product so as to eliminate infringement, nor from engaging in design, development, or testing for said purpose. Nothing in this Second Amended and Restated Permanent Injunction shall prohibit the Qualcomm Parties from importing into the United States any '686 Infringing Product, '317 Infringing Product, or '010 Infringing Product solely for the purpose of engaging in design, development, or testing so as to

eliminate infringement and/or effecting modification to eliminate infringement.

(Permanent Injunction, § V; emphasis supplied.) Thus, the use of WCDMA Infringing Products is permitted as part of the design-around efforts. The Court does not believe that Broadcom has established by clear and convincing evidence that Qualcomm has used unfair means in developing its xxx1 chips. The objection that Qualcomm may have used WCDMA Infringing Products after Qualcomm developed an initial design ignores the fact that there is substantial testing required at subsequent stages leading to introduction of a successful commercial product. (Peron Reply Decl., ¶¶ 7-10.) Moreover, the use of the WCDMA Infringing Products was not for developing the infringing TE function, but to develop a chip that would operate with that function disabled. The result is a product which lacks the patented feature.

Even assuming that Qualcomm used unfair means to develop a non-infringing design-around, the Court would have some reluctance to enjoin a product which does not infringe. The Court does not find Broadcom's analogy to trade secret law convincing. (Broadcom Opp., pp 32-33.) As noted, the Court finds that the predicate for this theory is lacking, and to the extent that the Court has found other contempts with regard to the '686 Patent, they do not warrant this remedy.

At oral argument, Broadcom stressed that its goal had been to secure an unfettered market opportunity, not monetary relief in the form of royalties for prospective sales of infringing WCDMA chips. (Tr. 20-21.) The most direct way to preserve that opportunity was to enjoin the sales of WCDMA chip after December 31, 2007, which is what the Court did. Whatever may be said for post-

Injunction support for infringing sales of WCDMA chips made in the Window, those were sale which by definition were lost. The Court believes that support of chips already sold had a secondary effect on Broadcom's ability to compete, and now even that support must cease. With regard to testing, it is hard to see how competition from the xxx1 chips, even if unfairly accelerated, had a significant effect where the Broadcom chip had the TE function and the xxx1 had none. The xxx1 chips cannot supply the patented, competitively advantageous function which Broadcom offers.

B. '010 Patent Payment.

Of the contempts which the Court has found, the failure to pay the '010 sun set royalty is the most egregious. As Broadcom contended at oral argument, payment, even with interest, merely requires Qualcomm to do what is should have done in the first place. (Tr. 24.) The Court agrees that there was more than a "failure to pay": so long a Qualcomm did not pay the royalty it was using technoloy it had no right to use. In formulating a remedy, the Court finds the district court's approach in Brine, Inc. v. STX, L.L.C., 367 F.Supp. 2d 61, 71 (D. Mass. 2005), instructive. There the court was searching for the appropriate punishment for a second infringement violation of its injunction, and concluded that gross profit was an appropriate measure. The court considered awarding net profits from the infringing activities, but concluded that gross profits were a better measure for two reasons:

1. As is recognized in other areas of the law, there are evidentiary difficulties inherent in calculating net profit (i.e. profit after all expenses, depreciation and tax). Given such uncertainty, there is increased risk that the plaintiff will not be made whole. In a contempt proceeding, the need to

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ensure that the plaintiff is fully compensated and that the defendant is deterred, is acute.

2. While an award of gross profit may overcompensate [the plaintiff] Brine, it will do so in an amount which bears a direct relationship to the degree of <u>infringement</u>: the more X2+s that were sold, the greater the award. As such, a sanction in the amount of gross profit from the sales of the X2+ provides a natural means of imposing a penalty that is proportionate to the severity of the contempt. 17

(Id. at 71; citation deleted; emphasis supplied.) One could argue that contempt here is different, in that Qualcomm did not engage in infringing conduct but simply failed to pay. But so long a Qualcomm failed to pay it was in fact infringing. Moreover, the Court regards the egregiousness of the conduct here of similar caliber to the contempt in Brine.¹⁸

Within thirty days, Qualcomm shall render under oath an accounting of all post-verdict Q-Chat payments related to Version 3.0 received from Sprint from May 29, 2007 through the date of this order and present calculation of its gross profit on such revenues. (Permanent Injunction, § VIII.) With respect to North

¹⁷In view of this monetary award which can be measured with respect to the conduct in contempt, the Court deletes from this Order provisions in its Tentative Minute Order imposing a surcharge on the award of attorney's fees. (Tentative Minute Order re Motion for Contempt, p. 18 ("The Court imposes a fifty percent surcharge on the award of attorney's fees and costs by way of monetary sanction for Qualcomm's contempts. The Court has no convenient way to assess the economic impact of Qualcomm's contempts, and a measure based on attorney's fees and costs is at least related to the burdens which Broadcom undertook by initiating this proceeding.").)

¹⁸Disgorgement of Qualcomm's unjust gain is not punitive; it merely transfers that gain to the party harmed by its conduct.

American Exclusivity payments, Qualcomm shall make a proration to include that portion of the payments reasonably attributable to the United States and shall state the basis for the proration. Within the same thirty days, Qualcomm shall pay Broadcom the calculated gross profits. The amount shown in the accounting shall be paid without regard to any challenge of the accuracy of the accounting; any such dispute shall be resolved by the Court, but shall not delay payment. The payment shall satisfy Qualcomm's royalty obligation under the '010 sunset provision through the date of this Order.

Should Qualcomm fail to make the accounting and payment as provided in this Order, the sunset provision for the '010 Patent shall automatically lapse, and shall only be reinstated upon further application to the Court by Qualcomm.

C. Suspension of Sunset Provisions.

The Court declines to suspend the sunset provisions for the '686 and '317 Patents.²⁰ Such a course would ignore the public interest aspects which figured prominently in the Court's decision to adopt sunset provisions in the first place. (Injunction Memo, pp. 8-9, 17-18.) With regard to the '010, the Court has set suspension as the penalty for failure to comply with royalty obligations ordered here.

D. Attorney's Fees.

¹⁹Upon appropriate application, the Court would consider allowing Broadcom to test the calculation by way of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and supporting request for production.

²⁰U.S. Patent No. 6,657,317.

An award of attorney's fees is a customary remedy in favor of a party who has successfully mounted a contempt proceeding. Perry v. O'Donnell, 759 F.2d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 1985). If Broadcom prevailed on no other portions of its claims than those related to WCDMA Infringing Products after December 31, 2007 and the failure to pay '010 sunset royalties, it would be the substantial victor here.

The Court has no doubt that litigating this contempt proceeding has been a substantial expense for both sides. Qualcomm's attorney's fees are a penalty which it must bear. Qualcomm must also pay Broadcom's reasonable attorney's fees and expenses.

Within thirty days, Broadcom shall present its application for reasonable attorney's fees and costs. The application shall be in sufficient detail for the Court to make the usual lodestar analysis. See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998). Within twenty days thereafter, Qualcomm may file any objections. Should the Court determine that a hearing would be useful, the Court will schedule one.

VII. Reporting Requirements.

Under the Permanent Injunction, each sunset provision carries a similar reporting requirement. Qualcomm must provide "periodic reports from which Broadcom can assess the proper royalties owed, detailing at least the volume of, and revenue derived by Qualcomm from, any post-May 29, 2007 sales of" the relevant Infringing Products. (E.g. Permanent Injunction, § I, Proviso § (b).) The sunset provisions permit sales and require royalty payment only on sales made to customers as of May 29, 2007 for products which the customer purchased prior to that date. (E.g., id., § I, Proviso.) Without the latter information for sales, one

cannot determine whether Qualcomm is paying the "proper royalty."

In its April 14, 2008 report, Qualcomm did not provide detail by customer and the chip purchased by the customer. Qualcomm did provide such detailed information as part of the limited discovery allowed by the Court on this Motion. (Order Granting in Part Broadcom's Application for Order to Show Cause re Contempt of Permanent Injunction, ¶ 3(a)-(e); see Qualcomm Opening Br., p. 40.)

While the Court cannot say that Qualcomm's report constituted substantial compliance, neither can it say that a contempt has been proved by clear and convincing evidence. Henceforth, Qualcomm shall support is periodic royalty reports with same level of detail subsequently provided for the April 14, 2008 report. With respect to the report for the second quarter of 2008, Qualcomm shall provide such information within thirty days.

VIII. Conclusion.

The Court finds that Broadcom has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the following activities by Qualcomm constitute contempt:

- Customer support for WCDMA Infringing Products after December 31, 2007, except for Licensed Activities and Verizon support.
- Employee use of WCDMA phones after December 31, 2007, except for Licensed Activities and Verizon support.
- Technical support rendered to WCDMA customers after December 31,
 2007, except for Licensed Activities and Verizon support.

• Failure to pay sunset royalties under the '010 Patent.

Qualcomm is ordered to cease its contemptuous conduct with regard to the '686 injunction immediately if it has not already done so and to comply with this Order's provisions regarding the '010 Patent.

The Court reserves determination whether Qualcomm should be held in contempt for offering to sell WCDMA Infringing Products in the United States, pending production of invoices for purchases associated with such offers.

The Court orders Qualcomm to prepare a revision to the April 14, 2008 royalty statement within thirty days which:

- Eliminates payment of royalties of WCDMA Infringing Products.
- Includes a revised inventory adjustment limited to product sales covered by the verdict to customers covered by the verdict.

The Court orders Qualcomm to render an accounting of '010 sunset revenues and gross profits and to make the payment described in Section VI.B within thirty days. A failure to do so will result in an automatic lapse of the '010 sunset license.

The Court orders Broadcom to submit an application for attorney's fees and costs in accordance with this Order within thirty days; Qualcomm may file any objections within twenty days thereafter.

DATED: August 28, 2008

JAMES V. SELNA / UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

EXHIBIT 2

1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINA Richmond Division
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5	ePlus, Inc.,
6	Plaintiff,
7	versus 309 CV 620
8	Lawson Software, Inc.
9	Defendant
10	
11	
12	
13	before: HONORABLE ROBERT E. PAYNE Senior United States District Judge
14	Senior onited States District oddge
15	
16	August 10, 2010 Richmond, Virginia
17	Richmond, Vilginia
18	
19	Phone Conference
20	
21	
22	Gilbert F. Halasz, RMR Official Court Reporter
23	U. S. Courthouse Richmond, Virginia
24	(804) 916-2248
25	

1 it cited itself from the Joyner decision, 2 nothing in either Daubert or the federal rules 3 of evidence requires a District Court to admit opinion that is connected to existing data only 4 5 by the ipse dixit of the expert. Ipse dixit 6 means that it is so because I say it is so. 7 That same precept has been adopted in Pugh 8 against Louisville Ladder, Incorporated in 361 9 federal appendix, and citing a number of cases, including Joyner, holding that the district 10 court discretion includes the discretion to 11 12 find that there is, citing Joyner, simply too 13 great an analytical gap between the data and 14 the opinion proffered in deciding whether or 15 not the proper evidence is of the ipse dixit 16 variety. In fact, the two text parts in 17 footnote four of that case, Pugh, make quite 18 clear the relationship and the nexus between 19 them. 20 In Bright against American Household 21 Products the fourth circuit pointed out that 22 Daubert aims to prevent expert speculation. 23 And to my knowledge those are the fundamental 24 rules by which rule 702 is to be applied. 25 Now, I have studied the deposition

1 testimony that was proffered, and I have 2 studied the report of Dr. Mangum. And I 3 believe that there is a great difference 4 between Mangum's report and the i4i, as 5 Mr. McDonald pointed out. There was a firm and 6 fixed and rationally-based bench mark that was 7 really unavailable in the i4i case. Here the 8 bench mark is really two litigation 9 settlements. For reasons which make -- I 10 understand that he articulated a reason, but I 11 never did -- I found it quite difficult to 12 understand. Dr. Mangum just threw out the 13 other litigation-related settlements. He just 14 picked the ones that had big numbers in them. 15 And the other three which he mentions in 16 his report he excludes from his analysis. 17 concludes that the Verian, the Sciquest and 18 Perfect Commerce agreements, which are also 19 settlements that were arrived at, Verian was 20 500,000 plus 2.5 percent running royalty on all 21 sales covered by the patents in suit in excess 22 of 15 million in a calendar year. Sciquest was a 2.4 million-dollar settlement. Perfect 23 24 Commerce, according to him, was a lump sum 25 payment of \$750,000. And his basis for

1 throwing those out was not an economic basis. 2 His basis for throwing them out was a 3 conclusory ipse dixit pronouncement. And it is 4 that he understood no discovery had occurred, 5 and it was that he understood that due to quick settlements ePlus did not receive information 6 7 that would allow it to form an understanding as 8 to the amount of accused revenue for any of 9 these parties. As a result, he says, the terms 10 of the agreements do not represent a complete 11 valuation of the specific use of the patents in 12 suit, but rather based on avoidance of 13 litigation. He also -- he says the most that 14 can be said out of those is they provide 15 evidence of the willingness by ePlus to enter 16 into fixed payment and running royalty license 17 agreements. So out of five possible settlement 18 agreements that he could have chosen to include 19 in his base he threw out for non economic 20 reasons the three lowest. 21 There is nothing that I know of that 22 permits an expert to pick and chose in 23 selecting the base in this fashion. 24 Now, the other thing is the base itself of 25 those that were selected are shaky under the

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               THE COURT: Do you think it does or not,
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          Mr. Robertson?
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               MR. ROBERTSON: Your Honor, I am still,
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          quite frankly, reacting to your ruling today,
 5
          taking it all in and thinking through a lot of
 6
          issues, and will be thinking about them in the
 7
          next few days as we prepare to meet with you on
 8
          Monday, August 16. You know, I am just
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          thinking out loud, Your Honor. So let me --
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               THE COURT: Well, here is a good idea.
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          Don't think out loud. It is a good idea.
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               MR. ROBERTSON: Okay. I think I will
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          reflect. I appreciate that, yes.
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               THE COURT: All right. Now, I am
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          considering that I dealt with these motions in
16
          limine. If you think otherwise, you have to
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          get them in front of me in some other way.
18
               All right. I think that is taken care of.
19
               MR. ROBERTSON:
                              Thank you, sir.
20
               THE COURT: Thank you all very much.
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               MR. MERRITT: Thank you, Your Honor. Bye.
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23
       THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPT.
24
                  Gilbert Frank Halasz, RMR
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                   Official Court Reporter
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EXHIBIT 3

		1	
1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	1	(The proceedings in this matter commenced at
0	FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA	2	9:30 a.m.)
2 3	RICHMOND DIVISION	3	,
-	:		THE OLEDY, O' I A C. A N. O COOLOGO
4	ePLUS, INC.,	4	THE CLERK: Civil Action No. 3:09CV620,
5	: Plaintiff, :	5	ePlus, Incorporated v. Lawson Software, Incorporated.
	v. : Civil Action	6	Mr. Scott L. Robertson, Mr. Craig T. Merritt,
6	: No. 3:09CV620	7	Ms. Jennifer A. Albert, Mr. Michael G. Strapp
7	LAWSON SOFTWARE, INC., : : March 25, 2011	8	represent the plaintiff. Mr. Daniel W. McDonald,
	Defendant. :	9	Mr. Dabney J. Carr IV, Ms. Kirstin L. Stoll-DeBell,
8 9		1	·
10	DAILY COPY	10	Mr. William D. Schultz, and Ms. Rachel C. Huey
11		11	represent the defendant.
12	COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. PAYNE	12	Are counsel ready to proceed?
13.	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE	13	MR. ROBERTSON: The plaintiff is, Your Honor.
14	APPEARANCEO	14	MR. McDONALD: Lawson is as well, Your Honor.
15 16	APPEARANCES: Scott L. Robertson, Esq.	15	THE COURT: All right. This is the
	Jennifer A. Albert, Esq.	16	evidentiary hearing on the issue of an injunction.
17	Michael T. Strapp, Esq.	1	, ,
18	GOODWIN PROCTOR 901 New York Avenue, NW	17	Is there another firm coming into this case
. •	Washington, D.C. 20001	18	for you-all?
19	Crain T. Marritt. Co.	19	MR. McDONALD: The Finnegan firm is involved,
20	Craig T. Merritt, Esq. CHRISTIAN & BARTON	20	Your Honor, but they are not going to be participating
	909 E. Main Street, Suite 1200	21	in this hearing. They are going to be involved with
21	Richmond, VA 23219-3095	22	the appeal primarily, but they wanted to have access
22 23	Counsel for the plaintiff ePlus	23	to the documents.
	DIANE J. DAFFRON, RPR		
24	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	24	THE COURT: Oh, okay.
25	STATES STATES SIGNALLY GOSTA	25	Mr. Robertson.
1 2 3	APPEARANCES: (Continuing) Daniel W. McDonald, Esq. Kirstin L. Stoll-DeBell, Esq. William D. Schultz, Esq.	1 2 3 4	MR. ROBERTSON: Good morning, Your Honor. If I might, I just have a few brief opening remarks to just sort of put some of the issues in context and then preview for the Court or highlight
4	MERCHANT & GOULD 3200 IDS Center		
7	80 South Eighth Street	5	some of the topics that are going to be addressed
5	Minneapolis, MN 55402-2215	6	today by Mr. Farber's testimony, if that's
6	Dabney J. Carr, IV, Esq.	7	permissible.
	TROUTMAN SANDERS	8	THE COURT: All right.
7	TROUTMAN SANDERS Troutman Sanders Building	8	THE COURT: All right. MR. ROBERTSON: First, we are here to discuss
	Troutman Sanders Building 1001 Haxall Point		MR. ROBERTSON: First, we are here to discuss
8	Troutman Sanders Building 1001 Haxall Point P.O. Box 1122	9	MR. ROBERTSON: First, we are here to discuss the supplemental evidence, testimony and documentation
8	Troutman Sanders Building 1001 Haxall Point	9 10 11	MR. ROBERTSON: First, we are here to discuss the supplemental evidence, testimony and documentation that have been provided to the Court and exchanged by
	Troutman Sanders Building 1001 Haxall Point P.O. Box 1122 Richmond, VA 23218-1122	9 10 11 12	MR. ROBERTSON: First, we are here to discuss the supplemental evidence, testimony and documentation that have been provided to the Court and exchanged by the parties since the trial ended that we believe will
8	Troutman Sanders Building 1001 Haxall Point P.O. Box 1122	9 10 11	MR. ROBERTSON: First, we are here to discuss the supplemental evidence, testimony and documentation that have been provided to the Court and exchanged by
8 9 10	Troutman Sanders Building 1001 Haxall Point P.O. Box 1122 Richmond, VA 23218-1122	9 10 11 12	MR. ROBERTSON: First, we are here to discuss the supplemental evidence, testimony and documentation that have been provided to the Court and exchanged by the parties since the trial ended that we believe will
8 9 10 11	Troutman Sanders Building 1001 Haxall Point P.O. Box 1122 Richmond, VA 23218-1122	9 10 11 12 13	MR. ROBERTSON: First, we are here to discuss the supplemental evidence, testimony and documentation that have been provided to the Court and exchanged by the parties since the trial ended that we believe will support the Court's discretion to grant an injunction
8 9 10 11 12	Troutman Sanders Building 1001 Haxall Point P.O. Box 1122 Richmond, VA 23218-1122	9 10 11 12 13 14	MR. ROBERTSON: First, we are here to discuss the supplemental evidence, testimony and documentation that have been provided to the Court and exchanged by the parties since the trial ended that we believe will support the Court's discretion to grant an injunction in this case to prevent the ongoing infringement of
8 9 10 11 12 13	Troutman Sanders Building 1001 Haxall Point P.O. Box 1122 Richmond, VA 23218-1122	9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR. ROBERTSON: First, we are here to discuss the supplemental evidence, testimony and documentation that have been provided to the Court and exchanged by the parties since the trial ended that we believe will support the Court's discretion to grant an injunction in this case to prevent the ongoing infringement of ePlus' patents.
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Troutman Sanders Building 1001 Haxall Point P.O. Box 1122 Richmond, VA 23218-1122	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR. ROBERTSON: First, we are here to discuss the supplemental evidence, testimony and documentation that have been provided to the Court and exchanged by the parties since the trial ended that we believe will support the Court's discretion to grant an injunction in this case to prevent the ongoing infringement of ePlus' patents. We certainly don't want to be here today, and I know the Court doesn't want to retry the case, or
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Troutman Sanders Building 1001 Haxall Point P.O. Box 1122 Richmond, VA 23218-1122	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR. ROBERTSON: First, we are here to discuss the supplemental evidence, testimony and documentation that have been provided to the Court and exchanged by the parties since the trial ended that we believe will support the Court's discretion to grant an injunction in this case to prevent the ongoing infringement of ePlus' patents. We certainly don't want to be here today, and I know the Court doesn't want to retry the case, or reargue a number of the issues involving hotly
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Troutman Sanders Building 1001 Haxall Point P.O. Box 1122 Richmond, VA 23218-1122	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR. ROBERTSON: First, we are here to discuss the supplemental evidence, testimony and documentation that have been provided to the Court and exchanged by the parties since the trial ended that we believe will support the Court's discretion to grant an injunction in this case to prevent the ongoing infringement of ePlus' patents. We certainly don't want to be here today, and I know the Court doesn't want to retry the case, or reargue a number of the issues involving hotty contested issues that are before the Court.
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Troutman Sanders Building 1001 Haxall Point P.O. Box 1122 Richmond, VA 23218-1122	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR. ROBERTSON: First, we are here to discuss the supplemental evidence, testimony and documentation that have been provided to the Court and exchanged by the parties since the trial ended that we believe will support the Court's discretion to grant an injunction in this case to prevent the ongoing infringement of ePlus' patents. We certainly don't want to be here today, and I know the Court doesn't want to retry the case, or reargue a number of the issues involving hotly
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Troutman Sanders Building 1001 Haxall Point P.O. Box 1122 Richmond, VA 23218-1122	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR. ROBERTSON: First, we are here to discuss the supplemental evidence, testimony and documentation that have been provided to the Court and exchanged by the parties since the trial ended that we believe will support the Court's discretion to grant an injunction in this case to prevent the ongoing infringement of ePlus' patents. We certainly don't want to be here today, and I know the Court doesn't want to retry the case, or reargue a number of the issues involving hotty contested issues that are before the Court.
8	Troutman Sanders Building 1001 Haxall Point P.O. Box 1122 Richmond, VA 23218-1122	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR. ROBERTSON: First, we are here to discuss the supplemental evidence, testimony and documentation that have been provided to the Court and exchanged by the parties since the trial ended that we believe will support the Court's discretion to grant an injunction in this case to prevent the ongoing infringement of ePlus' patents. We certainly don't want to be here today, and I know the Court doesn't want to retry the case, or reargue a number of the issues involving hotly contested issues that are before the Court. That said, there will be some additional
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Troutman Sanders Building 1001 Haxall Point P.O. Box 1122 Richmond, VA 23218-1122	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. ROBERTSON: First, we are here to discuss the supplemental evidence, testimony and documentation that have been provided to the Court and exchanged by the parties since the trial ended that we believe will support the Court's discretion to grant an injunction in this case to prevent the ongoing infringement of ePlus' patents. We certainly don't want to be here today, and I know the Court doesn't want to retry the case, or reargue a number of the issues involving hotly contested issues that are before the Court. That said, there will be some additional details concerning evidence that did come out that we
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Troutman Sanders Building 1001 Haxall Point P.O. Box 1122 Richmond, VA 23218-1122	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR. ROBERTSON: First, we are here to discuss the supplemental evidence, testimony and documentation that have been provided to the Court and exchanged by the parties since the trial ended that we believe will support the Court's discretion to grant an injunction in this case to prevent the ongoing infringement of ePlus' patents. We certainly don't want to be here today, and I know the Court doesn't want to retry the case, or reargue a number of the issues involving hotly contested issues that are before the Court. That said, there will be some additional details concerning evidence that did come out that we think would be important for the Court to consider.
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Troutman Sanders Building 1001 Haxall Point P.O. Box 1122 Richmond, VA 23218-1122	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR. ROBERTSON: First, we are here to discuss the supplemental evidence, testimony and documentation that have been provided to the Court and exchanged by the parties since the trial ended that we believe will support the Court's discretion to grant an injunction in this case to prevent the ongoing infringement of ePlus' patents. We certainly don't want to be here today, and I know the Court doesn't want to retry the case, or reargue a number of the issues involving hotty contested issues that are before the Court. That said, there will be some additional details concerning evidence that did come out that we think would be important for the Court to consider. I'd just like to highlight Section 154 of the

			- 10	earing - injunctive Relief 3/25/2011 8:54:0	U P
		217			21
1	THE WITNESS: Correct.		1	Q You indicated the amount of time it would take to	
2	THE COURT: Okay. That's fine.		2	go to an alternative system. Do you have an estimate	
3	THE WITNESS: But you need to carry the right	:	3	as to how long it would take a customer to actually	
4	amount of stock, not overstock or understock,		4	select and verify and implement a system that would	
5	otherwise you add far more cost to the health care		5	replace the Lawson eProcurement functionality?	
6	system than already exists.		6	A It's entirely up to the customer as to how long it	
7	THE COURT: That's hard to do.		7	would take to select, but from an implementation	
8	THE WITNESS: It's very hard to do.		8	perspective knowing how complex those implementations	
9	BY MR. McDONALD:		9	are, and I don't believe it's overstating it to say it	
10	Q So with respect to tracking, Mr. Hager	1	10	would be nine months probably on average.	
11	THE COURT: I just think you're overblowing	1	11	Q Is that within the range Mr. Farber provided	
12	it. You need to be accurate in what you're saying,	1	12	today?	
13	and it's important to know what actually takes place	1	13	A He provided 30 days to six months to potentially	
14	as opposed to the inflated view of things that takes	1	14	longer. Because of the very complex health care	
15	place. And if you sell an inflated view that I can't	1	15	organization we run, I believe it would fall in the	
16	buy, I'm just going reject the testimony in its	1	16	typically longer.	
17	entirety because you let him get on the witness stand	1	7	I do say that with some level of expertise. We	
18	and suggest that they can't conduct an operation	1	8	have 277 requisition self service health care only	
19	without this system and that the whole place will shut	1	9	customers that represent 2500 different hospitals,	
20	down in the middle of an operation without this	2	20	which is about a third of the hospitals in the United	
21	system, and that isn't what's at stake here.	2	21	States. We do have a lot of experience.	
22	And if that's the way you're going to try to	2	22	THE COURT: You have a lot of business and	
23	sell the issue, then what I'm going to do is say I	2	23	you have a lot of infringement, according to the jury.	
24	just don't buy any of it. And that's the risk you run	2	24	So the question I have to deal with is how to deal	
25	from overstating your case.	2	25	with it.	
		218			22
1	So try to confine it to what actually	1		THE WITNESS: I understand.	
2	happens. That's what's important anyway. And that's	2	2	THE COURT: Now, if you're shut down and a	
3	really what he knows most about, I would assume.	3	3	government agency comes in and finds that you're	
4	MR. McDONALD: Fair enough.	4	4	committing fraud and shuts down all your operations to	
5	BY MR. McDONALD:	5	5	do a search and seizure, how is somebody, for example,	
6	Q Can we talk, Mr. Hager, about the tracking that	6	3	who's using your system going to operate? Do you know	
7	your system does for those medical supplies for	7	7	that?	
8	operations? Can you walk us through how the Lawson	8	3	THE WITNESS: On day one, they would simply	
9	system is used to track, for example, the supplies	9	•	operate at risk.	
10	that are used for surgery in a hospital?	1 4.			
	• • •	1 10	0	THE COURT: They would find a way is what	
11	A Again, at the beginning of the process is the	11		THE COURT: They would find a way is what would happen.	
11 12	A Again, at the beginning of the process is the inventory management and inventory counting that is		1	·	
		1.	1 2	would happen.	
12	inventory management and inventory counting that is	12	1 2 3	would happen. THE WITNESS: For money, yes, they would.	
12 13	inventory management and inventory counting that is done. And that all gets loaded up into the system	1° 12 15	1 2 3 4	would happen. THE WITNESS: For money, yes, they would. THE COURT: Of course, it would. Of course,	
12 13 14	inventory management and inventory counting that is done. And that all gets loaded up into the system where somebody looks at the system and determines in	1' 12 10	1 2 3 4 5	would happen. THE WITNESS: For money, yes, they would. THE COURT: Of course, it would. Of course, it would.	
12 13 14 15	inventory management and inventory counting that is done. And that all gets loaded up into the system where somebody looks at the system and determines in what hospitals they need to have which materials	1° 13 14 14 18	1 2 3 4 5	would happen. THE WITNESS: For money, yes, they would. THE COURT: Of course, it would. Of course, it would. Now, suppose that we had a terrible	
12 13 14 15 16	inventory management and inventory counting that is done. And that all gets loaded up into the system where somebody looks at the system and determines in what hospitals they need to have which materials purchased, so that they have the adequate in stock	1° 12 13 14 18	1 2 3 4 5 6	would happen. THE WITNESS: For money, yes, they would. THE COURT: Of course, it would. Of course, it would. Now, suppose that we had a terrible catastrophe that wiped out where you have most of your	
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12 13 14 15 16 17	inventory management and inventory counting that is done. And that all gets loaded up into the system where somebody looks at the system and determines in what hospitals they need to have which materials purchased, so that they have the adequate in stock equipment. And then they run those through the purchase and	1° 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	would happen. THE WITNESS: For money, yes, they would. THE COURT: Of course, it would. Of course, it would. Now, suppose that we had a terrible catastrophe that wiped out where you have most of your support system. Are the hospitals going to be able to find somebody to help them straighten out and track	
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12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	inventory management and inventory counting that is done. And that all gets loaded up into the system where somebody looks at the system and determines in what hospitals they need to have which materials purchased, so that they have the adequate in stock equipment. And then they run those through the purchase and were able to follow it through the process to the loading dock, to the invoice matching, and ultimately	11 12 13 14 16 17 18 18	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	would happen. THE WITNESS: For money, yes, they would. THE COURT: Of course, it would. Of course, it would. Now, suppose that we had a terrible catastrophe that wiped out where you have most of your support system. Are the hospitals going to be able to find somebody to help them straighten out and track what's going on and be able to provide surgeries to people; yes or no?	
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Hager - Redirect 261 Hager - Redirect 263 1 THE WITNESS: They don't at the beginning. implementation of our RSS and pull it out and put something 1 2 THE COURT: After you ask the questions, you could 2 else in, you know, probably the simplest would be three months, 3 find out if it was RSS, for example, couldn't you? but I think on average for our hospitals. I bet you would it THE WITNESS: We could. probably be closer to nine months because of the complexities 4 5 THE COURT: And then you could say to the customer, of the hospital. 5 6 sorry, we can't do that? 6 You gave me the time. I was actually asking - maybe you 7 THE WITNESS: We could once we've narrowed it down to were thinking of time cost, but I think the question is 7 8 RSS 8 actually going to the monetary cost. 9 THE COURT: But you have to go through all that. Yeah, that's going to run somewhere north of 300,000, 3-9 10 THE WITNESS: We would, yes. 10 to 500,000 probably for that length of time. Maybe up to 11 Q Would you be able to narrow it down that way while you're 11 750,000 on average. Some will be greater than a million. 12 still on the phone with the customer in all instances, or 12 THE COURT: Does it cost that much to put RSS in? THE WITNESS: Some of our projects -- again, we put 13 sometimes, or what? 13 14 A Sometimes it would be while we're on the phone. Other 14 RSS in in conjunction with everything else, but it's so tied 15 times it would likely be weeks and potentially months. 15 into the work flow approvals, and our work flow approvals are 16 Q Why is that? 16 based off everything that happens in RSS, so pulling RSS out 17 A Because it's a very complex system. Sometimes defects, 17 means you are rebuilding all those work flow approvals to go 18 whether they're intermittent or what have you, you have to with whatever new tool you are bringing in, and that's really 18 19 really dig in there and try to identify what the root cause is. 19 where the complication comes. I wish it didn't take this long, 20 We have many calls in our call center that have been open for 20 21 months because we haven't been able to identify the location of 21 Q And finally, Mr. Robertson asked you about the advantages 22 the issue. That's pretty common in the software industry. 22 of selling the full suite, and I want to clarify, if the 23 MR. McDONALD: Any other questions that you have on 23 customer already has an SAP ERP suite, for example, do you have 24 that, Your Honor? an advantage over ePlus in selling to a customer like that 24 25 Q You were asked about the cost increase for your customers that's looking for eProcurement? 262 264 Hager - Redirect 262 Hager - Redirect 264 that have RSS if they had to make a change; do you recall that? A No. As a matter of fact, a disadvantage, because our RSS 2 and Punchout won't work with an SAP suite. We wouldn't even 3 Q Do you have an estimate as to how much it would cost 3 attempt to make that sell. 4 your -- let's take a hospital, how much money it would actually 4 Q So when is it that Lawson would have actually have some advantage for offering the full suite that Mr. Robertson was cost them to make a change or not? 5 6 MR. ROBERTSON: Objection, lack of foundation, Your 6 asking about? MR. ROBERTSON: Your Honor, I didn't ask -- I asked 7 Honor, and I think it's outside the scope of my cross-examine. 7 8 THE COURT: I think it's within the scope of your 8 him about whether or not having that full suite put my client 9 cross-examination. I don't know whether he -- I think he's 9 at a disadvantage. THE COURT: Sustained. asking a foundational question, that is whether he knows or has 10 Q So in that situation then, can you explain what type of 11 any basis to know what the cost is. 11 12 MR. ROBERTSON: Also, certainly there was no customer would be the customer -documentation produced in the supplemental period with respect THE COURT: What situation? 13 13 14 to the cost issue. 14 Q Where Lawson would have that advantage or ePlus would have the disadvantage to Lawson, what specific market situation 15 MR. McDONALD: But he asked about it, so I thought we 15 16 should flush that out. I'll ask the foundational question. 16 17 Q Mr. Hager, from your experience, do you have an idea of 17 A As was mentioned, when we're selling the entire integrated 18 how much it would cost, for example, a hospital to make that 18 suite, it's obviously because the customer wants a fully 19 change away from RSS? 19 integrated suite, so that would become our competitive 20 A I do have some experience with that, yes. 20 advantage. I should also mention that, you know, our RSS --21 Q Based on your experience, what would you believe to be the 21 MR. ROBERTSON: Objection, Your Honor. He's 22 likely cost to a hospital for that change? 22 responded to the question. 23 A For a hospital, the hospital - very large hospitals I 23 THE COURT: Sustained. 24 think would be more expensive than some of the non-hospital RSS 24 THE WITNESS: Actually, it's a follow-on to the --25 customers we have, so if I were to take the simplest 25 THE COURT: No, that's enough.

289 here to the public interest has been greatly exaggerated. What we have in the record are two declarations from two hospital workers who essentially say that this is basically a monetary inconvenience and would be, you know, disruptive, but nobody says - the Court, I think, explored during examination its questions of the witness that, you know, the sky is going to 7 fall here, and so that's all we have with respect to that other 8 than attorney argument. 9 And there are other ways to handle this, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: You have Mr. Hager's testimony. 11 MR. ROBERTSON: And he was basically addressing, 12 first of all, the money that might be involved, and there are 13 indemnifications provisions that Lawson has. It's chosen to 14 build its business upon a foundation of infringement. It can't 15 turn around and say, we shouldn't be enjoined now because we've been too effective infringers, and the case law says that as 16 17 well. But there are options for Your Honor, one of which is 18 what's been phrased the sunset provision which means the 19 injunction could enter, but the Court could say it's not going 20 to be effective with perhaps the hospitals for 90 days, 21 something along those lines such that they can, with as minimal 22 disruption as possible, replace the infringing software. 23 THE COURT: Yes, I understand. MR. ROBERTSON: So we'll be addressing that in the 24 25 briefing as well. Thank you. 290 290 MR. McDONALD: Your Honor, I'm not sure where we're 2 at. I've been asked to point out, in my self interest as well, we have a 7:20 flight. Is it something that's going to end soon, or do you want us --5 THE COURT: Goodbye. I'm thinking about a slight 6 moving of the date of the hearing because of the length of what you all have done on this one, but I won't do it, so go catch 8 your plane 9 MR. McDONALD: Thank you, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: All right. 11 12 (End of proceedings.) 13 14 15 We certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript 16 from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 17 18 19 P. E. Peterson, RPR Date 20 21 22 Diane J. Daffron, RPR Date 23 24 25

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of February, 2012, I will electronically file the foregoing

DECLARATION OF SRIKANTH K. REDDY AND EXHIBITS 1, 2 AND 3 IN SUPPORT OF ePLUS INC.'s OPPOSITION TO LAWSON'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE EXPERT OPINIONS OF DR. KEITH UGONE

with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will then send a notification of such filing (NEF) via email to the following:

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